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One of the vital questions connected with the system transformation in Poland 
and other former Soviet Bloc countries is whether the overthrow of the commu-
nist system was caused by the poor state of their economies or rather people’s 
struggle for their civil rights. However, the “either/or nature” of this question 
is disturbed by another possibility: it might have been a relatively good state of 
the economy which made the overthrow possible. Moreover, there is no doubt 
that the introduction of free market and democracy resulted in many positive 
changes in people’s lives: from the increase in life expectancy and subjective 
well–being to the growth of civil liberty. Yet, economic development and (more 
broadly) modernity also produce extensively described negative effects which, 
at certain point, seem to “neutralise” their positive ones. Poland and other 
Central and Eastern European countries seem to follow this path. 
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Before the system transformation of the late 1980s and early 1990s in Eastern and 
Central Europe, it had seemed certain that the only thing that communism had brought 
about was “doom and gloom”. The early days under the rule of democracy and the 
“finally free” market were full of promise and made people hope for a better future. 
However, the reality proved, to say at least, a bit less promising. 
In the official discourse, it is still underlined that what Poles and people in oth-
er Central- and Eastern-European countries fought for was freedom of speech and 
thought as well as democracy. However, it appears that what most of them actually did 
struggle for was rather the freedom to consume. At that point, there was a common 
belief that the goods that people in Western Europe had access to could make us fully 
happy. Or, in other words, the lack of products was what made most people dissatis-
fied with the quality of life. One can still remember those trips to “magical places” 
such as Germany, where you could eat a hamburger in a McDonald’s restaurant or buy 
a few packets of bubble gum for your children. A recent survey by Centre for Public 
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Opinion Research (CPOR) has shown that the majority of Poles consider “full shelves” 
to be the biggest achievement of the transformation of 1989 (Centrum… 2010). 
Almost 20 years after the transformation, however, it seems to be clear that though 
the free market and democracy have made people happier in many respects, they also 
have caused a lot of suffering. Why do people feel unhappy and happy nowadays? 
Why does it appear that, contrary to the official public discourse, economic growth 
is not able to sustain or increase the level of well-being among people? How do old 
lifestyles merge with the new ones from the West and how does it affect the quality 
of life?
The article is based on the statistical data from the following sources: World Values 
Survey 2010, Diagnoza Społeczna 2000, Diagnoza Społeczna 2007 and Diagnoza 
Społeczna 2009 (Poland), International Monetary Fund and other sources cited in the 
referenced books and articles. 
1.
All the things that happened throughout Central and Eastern Europe on the verge of 
1980s and 1990s seem to have had one thing in common. They brought about the feel-
ing of freedom and hope for a better future. The citizens of countries such as Lithua-
nia, Poland or (former) Czechoslovakia could see bright days ahead of them. The most 
important words seemed to be democracy, liberty, but also: free market. And indeed, 
though it is often said that it was people’s struggle for democracy, freedom of speech, 
etc. which gave rise to the overthrow of the communist system, it makes one wonder 
whether the economy was not the focal factor. Of course, democracy is a much broader 
concept than, for example, liberal market economy, but it is hard to imagine that most 
of the citizens of the countries in the communist bloc were actually more interested in 
democratic virtues than just in the opportunity to “lead a normal life”. One might ask, 
what it meant to them. What was it about the West that fascinated them so much? Was 
it the freedom of speech, or rather, the possibility of buying food and petrol on a daily 
basis? This article is not aiming at answering those kinds of questions, however, as it 
would probably be very difficult to do it in such a short form. Nevertheless, maybe we 
should at least take a closer look at the possibility that it was rather economic back-
ground which made the overthrow possible, not the other way round. 
Some authors suggest that there is no correlation between the state of the economy, 
i.e. GDP per capita, and the political shift form autocracy towards democracy. For 
instance, Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi claim that according to their re-
search of regime shifts between 1950s and 1990s, there is no evidence that economic 
growth encourages a shift from the former towards the latter (Przworski, Limongi 
1997: 160). What they suggest is that economic growth is merely likely to help sustain 
democratic rule. That is in agreement with Seymour Martin Lipset’s claim that “the 
more well-to-do a nation, the better the chance that it sustains democracy” (Welzel, 
Inglehart 2005: 81). So is it democracy which provides conditions in which economy 
thrives, or the free market which causes the autocratic systems to collapse? The kind 
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of statistics Przeworski and Limongi are referring to suggest that the former is the 
case. Especially if one takes into consideration the fact that in the twilight of their 
existence, communist state economies were in quite poor condition.
But indeed, there is a vast array of data which suggests the latter possibility as 
well. For instance, Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart say that the figures gathered 
by Przeworski and Limongi may not necessarily prove that there is no correlation 
between economic growth and the shift towards democracy (Welzel, Inglehart 2005: 
82). Przeworski and Limongi examined how often the nations classified as “autocrat-
ic” had shifted towards democracy. However, as Welzel and Inglehart claim, the prob-
lem with this is that poor countries are generally unstable, which means they are far 
more likely to overthrow any kind of political regime on a general basis, irrespective 
of whether they are democratic or autocratic. According to their analysis, if one takes 
into consideration not only the frequency of changes both away from and towards de-
mocracy, but economic growth as well, then the data reveal dramatically different pat-
terns: “In countries with per capita incomes below $1000, changes toward democracy 
emerge only one-tenth as often as changes toward autocracy. But in countries with 
per capita incomes above $7000, changes toward democracy emerge 28 times as of-
ten as changes into autocracy. Each $1000 unit increase in per capita income roughly 
doubles the proportion of changes toward democracy […] economic development does 
contribute to the emergence of democracy and it does so dramatically. Economic de-
velopment acts on the regime selection process, introducing a strong bias in favour 
of democracy” (Welzel, Inglehart 2005: 83–84). Based on this sort of evidence, con-
cluding that the growth of economy was the major factor behind the regime shifts in 
Central- and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s would be a very tempt-
ing thing to do: if a shift toward democracy takes place, it is far more probable that it 
does so because the economy of a particular country is in good condition. 
However, one can think of at least one issue which does not make it as straightfor-
ward as it seems to be. First of all, there is still a strong argument behind the fact that, 
indeed, communist economies had been struggling a lot before being overthrown. 
Understandably, this makes one wonder whether the poor state of the economy might 
have been the original cause here. Let us not forget about the fact that a large group 
of Soviet Bloc citizens did have an opportunity to see what life looked like in the 
West, if not in person, then through the members of their family or friends. And the 
first and most memorable things they had encountered were probably not the freedom 
of speech or trias politica, but rather cars in the streets or full supermarket shelves, 
which mean that people in countries such as Poland could have felt economically de-
prived. If we agree that this was the case, then it seems obvious that economic crisis 
was something which led to the eagerly anticipated changes. Nevertheless, it is abso-
lutely essential to realize that the relative poverty here is much more important than 
the absolute one. The citizens of the Soviet Bloc countries felt poor, but in comparison 
to other countries throughout the world, the situation was not even close to dramatic. 
For instance, as of 2009 the GDP per capita of Gambia is $1430 which forces its in-
habitants to deal with undoubtedly more adverse conditions (International Monetary 
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Fund 2010). This means that it cannot have been objective poverty which led to the 
shift towards democracy. The citizens of the Soviet Bloc states, while not quite well-
off, in most cases, were not on the verge of struggle for survival. In the late 1980s, 
people were not starving or fighting to make ends meet on a daily basis, which is 
hardly the case when one takes a look into statistics now: as of 2009, 41.2% people 
in Poland claim everyday life used to be easier before 1989, while only 27.2% say it 
is easier now (Diagnoza… 2009: 233).  Moreover,  the gap between the rich and the 
poor is as wide as ever: the wealthiest families earn on average as much as 1591 PLN 
(net) per capita in a family while the poverty stricken merely 653 PLN (Diagnoza… 
2009: 43). The gap, at almost 250%, is wider than in 2000 when it was around 200% 
(Diagnoza... 2000: 18). Hence, in many cases, numerous groups tend to experience 
more financial difficulties and anxiety today than they used to in the past. 
As a result, it would be difficult to prove that in the late 1980s ordinary people in 
Central and Eastern Europe were so eager to abolish the system because of the ob-
jectively difficult economical situation they found themselves in. On the contrary, the 
hard statistical fact is that while in 1950 GDP per capita in Poland was around $2400, 
by the end of the 1980s it was more than twice as high, which, according to Welzel 
and Inglehart, makes the transition towards democracy six times more probable. At the 
same time, this result was much better than that of many other countries throughout 
the world. So, in absolute terms, Poland was not in the most difficult economic situa-
tion possible. The same is true about countries such as (former) Czechoslovakia.  For 
instance, as of 1990, the GDP per capita of the Czech Republic was $8895 and it was 
not much smaller in Slovakia either – $77621 (Maddison 2006: 165). However, that is 
not to say that financial aspects were not important. They did matter, but in relative 
terms. As noted earlier, the curtain between the East and West could have been made 
of iron, but only in a metaphorical sense. It was impossible for Czechs or Slovaks 
not to see that life in neighbouring Austria, with its GDP per capita of $16,881, was 
indeed different (Maddison 2006: 165). Naturally, what could be observed gave only 
a superficial picture of life under capitalism. But still, it must have looked as if life in 
Austria, with all the cars and highways, colour TVs and a wide variety of products 
available, was incomparably fuller and more enjoyable. 
 To sum up, if the economic situation indeed had been a major force behind the 
process of the shift towards democracy in Central and Eastern Europe it was not be-
cause it was so severe, but rather it was perceived as such by the citizens of the Soviet 
Bloc countries. Moreover, this does not stand in opposition to the fact that, in objec-
tive terms, the condition of those economies was not dramatically serious and precise-
ly because of this, the shift was even more likely. That is, if we agree with Welzel and 
Inglehart that countries with a GDP per capita of about $7000 dollars are 28 times 
more likely to change from autocracy towards democracy than those with a GDP per 
capita of $1000.
1 Unfortunately, I have not been able to find the data from 1989, but it can be assumed that it was not much 
lower because in 1973 it was already $7041 for Czechoslovakia (Maddison 2006: 165). 
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Yet, all that being said, one cannot assume a direct link between wealth and democ-
racy, poverty and autocracy. In many cases, it appears that it is democracy that pro-
vides the conditions for a thriving economy. As Welzel and Inglehart put it: “Getting 
rich does not automatically make a country democratic – if it did, the oil exporting 
countries would be model democracies.  Instead, we argue that the impact of eco-
nomic development on democracy works primarily through its tendency to give rise 
to cultural changes that place increasing emphasis on human emancipation and self-
expression” (Welzel, Inglehart 2005: 84). Accordingly, it is not merely money which 
causes countries to turn away from authoritarian regimes, but rather, the emergence 
of certain values that make masses strive for democracy. A strong contra-argument in 
this case could be that if it had not been for such international events as the end of the 
Cold War, nor the elites of the opposition in the countries under Soviet rule, the over-
throw would have been impossible. The authors are well aware of this: “The choices 
of elites and international events […] are also unquestionably important: though a 
number of East European countries had already developed the mass-level precondi-
tions for democratization by the 1980s, these mass preferences could have little im-
pact as long as the threat of intervention by the Red Army was present. But as soon as 
that threat was withdrawn, societal factors that had seemed to be irrelevant up to that 
point, such as mass values, suddenly became crucial elements in deciding whether de-
mocracy would emerge” (Welzel, Inglehart 2005: 84). Therefore, taking into consid-
eration everything that has been said so far, it was neither the low standards of living 
nor the abundance of things as such which led to the decline of the Soviet Bloc and 
the emergence of a number of democratic countries throughout Eastern and Central 
Europe. It was not just poverty, nor merely affluence but rather something that could 
be described as one of “the effects of modernity” or, as Anthony Giddens calls them, 
“the consequences of modernity” (see Giddens 1990). One of its effects is the fact that 
people tend to focus increasingly on self-expression and emancipation. However, this 
is only possible if we provide them with the conditions for that. And those conditions 
are provided mainly by the process of industrialization and the project of modernity. 
Modernity itself is an extremely vast subject and one cannot attempt to cover it 
in such a short form. However, things such as the introduction of public education, 
the development of medicine, increasing interest in issues such as hygiene and public 
health must have had an impact on people’s longevity. For us, however, the main focus 
is the economic background. Although, undoubtedly, the project of modernity was 
closely associated with the beginnings of capitalism, it was also connected with indus-
trialization which could be implemented by the Soviet regime without the need of free 
market. The communist establishment became really involved in the idea though they 
were not fond of capitalism. Hundreds of thousands people were either made to work 
or willingly did so in heavy industry. The process of industrialization, which may 
not have been as astonishingly successful when deprived of free market, still brought 
about crucial changes to people’s lives for it did cause economic growth throughout 
the countries under the Soviet rule. As Inglehart puts it: “as economic development 
takes place, human life expectancy rises. In the poorest countries of the world, even 
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today the average life expectancy is forty years or less. In the richest societies, such 
as Japan or Switzerland, it approaches eighty years. But this relationship is curvilin-
ear. We find a steep rise in life expectancy as income rises from the subsistence level 
to several thousand dollars per year; but when we reach the ranks of the advanced 
industrial societies, there is very little increase. Life expectancy in Germany is no 
higher than it is in Ireland, even though the average German income is twice as high. 
This suggests that industrialization and economic growth have a tremendous payoff in 
terms of human survival, but beyond a certain point they bring diminishing returns” 
(Inglehart 2000: 215–216).  This happens irrespectively of whether a given country is 
capitalist or socialist partly because of other components of modernity (in which both 
kinds of regimes were involved). These include the development of medicine (e.g. the 
discovery of antibiotics), extensive public healthcare (e.g. mass vaccinations) or public 
education (putting an increasing stress on personal hygiene which helped prevent a 
lot of diseases from spreading). Industrialization brings about changes which affect 
the lives of masses even if they are made to live in socialist economies and under less 
liberal regimes for it “brings tremendous payoff in terms of human survival” only up 
to the point of several thousand dollars. When this level is surpassed, the economic 
growth brings “increasingly diminishing returns”. This threshold had been passed by 
all the Soviet Bloc countries long before the late 1980s. The case of Poland illustrates 
it plainly: while in 1950 (GDP per capita of $2447) the average life expectancy was 
lower than 60 years (58.8), in 1990 it reached almost 70 years (68.6) (Główny Urząd 
Statystyczny 2010). At that time, the GDP per capita was $5115 (Maddison 2006). A 
twofold growth of income caused a steep increase of 10 years in the longevity of the 
population. In the next 19 years, GDP per capita rose threefold: up to an all-time high 
of $17.989 (International Monetary Fund 2010). At the same time the average life ex-
pectancy rose to 75.54 years (Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2010). As we can see, while 
a twofold increase of income in the beginnings of industrialization brought about an 
increase of ten years longer life, a threefold rise caused “diminishing returns” of fewer 
than 7 years. And Poland is now approaching the point when average life expectancy 
becomes less and less associated with the increase in wealth of a given society. Yet, 
this is only one of “the effects of modernity” though the next one is its outcome. The 
unprecedented rise of life expectancy and the growth of safety of survival brought 
about another, even more important, phenomenon: a major shift in people’s attitudes 
and the predominant values they represent.
As Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker observe: “[…] economic development has sys-
tematic and, to some extent, predictable cultural and political consequences. These 
consequences are not iron laws of history; they are probabilistic trends. Nevertheless, 
the probability is high that certain changes will occur, once a society has embarked on 
industrialization” (Inglehart, Baker 2000: 20). This claim is based on the quantitave 
research carried out across the globe since 1981: The World Values Survey. So far 65 
countries representing 75% of the world’s population have been closely examined by 
the researchers. There have been five waves of the survey: 1981, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 
2005. A vast body of evidence gathered so far suggests that there are certain trends 
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connected with industrialization. Although they are subject to some degree of change; 
especially dependent on the socio-cultural background, they can be described as more 
or less universal: “industrialization leads to occupational specialization, rising educa-
tional levels, rising income levels, and eventually brings unforeseen changes – chang-
es in gender roles, attitudes toward authority and sexual norms, declining fertility 
rates, broader political participation, and less easily led publics. Determined elites in 
control of the state and the military can resist these changes, but in the long run, it 
becomes increasingly costly to do so and the probability of change rises” (Inglehart, 
Baker 2000: 21). This sounds like the story of the socialist system being overthrown 
in a number of countries across Central and Eastern Europe. The important question 
here is: what is the mechanism behind these changes? Why do they happen irrespec-
tively of where industrialization takes place? Though, as noted earlier, this process is 
path-dependent to some degree, it exists universally around the globe (for more, see 
Inglehart, Baker 2000: 42–50). 
In this line, Inglehart and Baker claim that on the basis of a vast body of evi-
dence from World Values Survey, one can distinguish two types of shifts in the pre-
eminent values, which are connected with industrialization and, on a broader outline, 
economic development. The first one is the move away from traditional orientations 
to secular-rational orientations toward authority. Traditional societies tend to: have 
a relatively low level of tolerance for abortion, divorce or homosexuality, underline 
male dominance in family life and politics, put emphasis on obedience towards au-
thority and the importance of family life and, most of them, on religion. Societies 
with secular rational values favour the opposite.  The other dimension of changes con-
nected with industrialization and economic growth is the shift from survival values 
to self-expression values.  The more well-off a nation is, the more its citizens tend to 
emphasize self expression values at the cost of survival values. Yet, these two major 
shifts have their different reasons. Inglehart and Baker “[…] suggest that economic 
development gives rise to not just one, but two main dimensions of cross-cultural dif-
ferentiation: a first dimension linked with early industrialization and the rise of the 
working class; a second dimension that reflects the changes linked with the affluent 
conditions of advanced industrial society and with the rise of the service and knowl-
edge sectors” (Inglehart, Baker 2000: 21). In saying so, they refer to Daniel Bell’s 
characteristic of pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial societies (for more, see 
Bell 1973, 1976). While pre-industrial life was based on “game against nature” – the 
struggle for survival, industrial life becomes “game against fabricated nature” – the 
harnessed nature is not longer a source of uncertainty, but people have to deal with 
things such as bureaucracy, machines, etc. As a result, the role of religion diminishes 
being supplanted by the materialistic and scientific visions of the world. All of these 
are connected with the early phases of industrialization and the rise of the working 
class. However, as industrialization and economic growth progress, there is yet an-
other crucial change which leads the prevailing values in another direction: with the 
rise of the service class, life becomes more a “game between persons” than “against 
fabricated nature”. This introduces a shift from survival values toward self-expression 
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values. People do not spend most of the time dealing with machines but dealing with 
other people; the most economically important sectors are the ones based on “soft” 
interpersonal skills, and the most successful companies are those which know what to 
produce rather than just how to do it (Inglehart, Baker 2000: 22). 
Post-modern or, in other words, post-materialist values prevail in post-World War 
II affluent societies. “During the period since World War II, advanced industrial socie-
ties have attained much higher real-income levels than ever before in history. Coupled 
with the emergence of the welfare state, this has brought about an historically unprec-
edented situation: Most of their population does not live under conditions of hunger 
and economic insecurity. This has led to a gradual shift in which needs for belonging, 
self-expression, and a participant role in society became more prominent. Prolonged 
periods of prosperity tend to encourage the spread of post-materialist values; econom-
ic decline tends to have the opposite effect (Inglehart 2000: 221). However, one cannot 
claim that there is a simple, one to one relationship between the level of income and 
the prevalence of post-materialist values. They have been gradually changing in afflu-
ent societies along with the generational trends. The older people are, the more they 
tend to be materialists. Yet, when we move from older groups to younger ones, the 
numbers of materialists decline in favour of post-materialists. Among people born af-
ter World War II, post-materialists outnumber materialists. “Societies at the early stag-
es of the curve [of rising GDP per capita] tend to emphasize economic growth at any 
price. But as they move beyond a given threshold, they begin to emphasize quality of 
life concerns such as environmental protection and lifestyle issues” (Inglehart 2000: 
219). Inglehart’s theory about the origins of this intergenerational change consists of 
two assumptions. The first one is the “scarcity hypothesis”: an individual’s priorities 
are the mirror of their socio-economic background. One places the greatest subjective 
value on the things which are in the shortest supply. The other is the “socialization 
hypothesis”: the rapid changes in the socio-economic background do not have a di-
rect, one-to-one impact on an individual’s basic values for “these values reflect one’s 
subjective sense of security, not one’s economic level per se. While rich people tend 
to feel more secure than poor people, one’s sense of security is also influenced by the 
cultural setting and social welfare institutions in which one is raised” (Inglehart 2000: 
221). In the early stages of our life, we are pre-wired for some kinds of preferences, 
which are not easily supplanted by others. Therefore, in order for materialist values 
to shift toward post-materialist ones, a substantial time lag is needed. This trend can 
also be observed in Poland: in 1992, 37.2% of people declared that money is one of the 
three most important things in life. In 2009, we can see a drop to 30.3%. At the same 
time, Polish people seem to put increasing emphasis on friends – a rise from 4.7% to 
10.4% (Diagnoza… 2009: 196). So far, however, Poles are steadily devoted to family, 
which supports Inglehart’s and Baker’s claim that while the trends connected with 
industrialization and economic growth are universal, they are also path dependent 
because the socio-cultural and historical background plays a huge role. This means 
that in order to judge the changes in the system of values brought about by first in-
dustrialization, economic development and then the transition to democracy and the 
introduction of free market, we still need time. 
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2.
Nevertheless, the case of Poland fits another, probably the most important trend con-
nected with the economic development of industrial and post-industrial societies. 
Economic growth has been proved to provide people with a high level of subjective 
well-being, which in other words can be described as “the level of happiness”. The 
typical questions asked in surveys to determine its level are: “How would you assess 
your life as a whole?”, or “Taking everything into consideration, how would you asses 
your life these days?”. There is already a long history of this kind of research dating 
back at least until the early 1980s. World Values Survey is one of the first ones that 
started an in-depth cross-national analysis of the issue2. 
Though it would seem that subjective well-being is dependent on things such as 
cultural background, physical condition, social comparison or the socially constructed 
meaning of “good life”, it has been proved that it is most closely connected with the 
level of economic development, i.e. GDP per capita and other factors connected with 
modern, liberal, free-market democracies. Ruut Veenhoven observes that “if subjec-
tive well-being is a culture-specific construct, its determinants will also be culturally 
specific. Hence empirical studies on correlates of subjective well-being must show 
considerable cultural variation and hardly any universal pattern. Yet the available data 
show otherwise. Comparison of average subjective well-being across nations reveals 
a common pattern. Subjective well-being is systematically higher in nations that pro-
vide a decent standard of living, that are politically democratic and well governed, 
and where the cultural climate is characterized by trust and tolerance. Together these 
objective societal characteristics explain about 75% of the differences in subjective 
well-being across nations” (Veenhoven 2008: 49). 
Hence, Poland meets all the requirements of being a “happy nation” and it surely 
is. Between 1991 and 2007, the number of people who “assess their life as a whole” as 
“rather good” or “good” rose from roughly 57% up to 72% (Diagnoza… 2007). These 
numbers are close to the results in countries such as Germany or France, which are 
much wealthier than Poland. 50.9% of Germans choose 8, 9 or 10 (on a 1–10 scale, 
where 1 means “dissatisfied with life” and 10 – the opposite) when asked: “All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?”. 44.1% of 
French people do the same. Poland has astonishingly good results in the same survey: 
47.9% (World Values Survey 2005). Although there is a lot to cheer about when we 
read such statistics, the general trends also tell us that working even harder, spend-
ing even more time at the office than with your family in order to be economically 
successful will most probably not bring the foreseen effects. Indeed, Poles will be 
2 There are a lot of issues connected with the notion itself which cannot be discussed here. These include ques-
tions such as: how people assess their lives (what kind of information do they draw from when asked to judge 
their life); is the level of well-being something we are born pre-wired for; is it rather based on social compari-
son or an individual’s personality; is subjective well-being based on hedonic fulfillment (the positive balance 
between “goods” and “bads”, joyful and negative experiences in one’s life) or rather the feeling of fulfilment 
connected with the values one appreciates?
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even wealthier, but they are unlikely to become much happier in their lives. That is 
because of the fact that “the peoples of rich societies are happier than those of poor 
societies. The overall correlation is very strong (0.68). But beyond a certain point, the 
curve levels off. As we move from low-income societies to high-income societies, 
there is a steep increase in subjective well-being. But the impact of rising income 
stops when we reach the threshold of $10,000. Beyond that point, there is practically 
no relationship between income and subjective well-being. The Irish are happier than 
the Germans, although the Germans are twice as wealthy. And the Taiwanese are as 
happy as the Japanese although the Japanese are three times as wealthy” (Inglehart 
2000: 218). Poland has already passed this threshold, which poses some important 
questions for the future. The development of post-industrial economies, while bring-
ing about the safety of survival and diminishing the risk of sudden death or starva-
tion, is also widely recognized to impose anxiety, uncertainty and illnesses unknown 
to the people of yesteryear (for more about the links between subjective well-being 
and the difficulties of post-modern everyday life, see Frank 2007). 
At the same time getting wealthier brings diminishing returns. This is the dilemma 
brought about by economic growth which was first mentioned by Richard A. Easterlin 
in his two now–famous articles: “Does Money Buy Happiness?” (Easterlin 1973) and 
“Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?” (Easterlin 1974). Among ex-
amples of extremely rich and not particularly happy countries one can find Japan. 
As Robert H. Frank says: “[it] was a very poor country in 1960. Since then, its per 
capita income has risen several-fold, and is now among the highest in the industr-
ialised world. Yet the average happiness level reported by the Japanese is no higher 
now than in 1960. They have more washing machines, cars, cameras and other things 
than they used to, but they haven’t registered significant gains on the happiness scale” 
(Frank 2007: 67). Another important factor is that economic growth brings not only 
diminishing returns, but is also a source of new kinds of anxiety, illness and further 
complexities of contemporary everyday life. This subject is thoroughly described by, 
among others, Avner Offer in his book “The Challenge of Affluence” (Offer 2006). 
In the wake of democracy and free market in Poland, Lech Walęsa fantasized about 
it becoming a “second Japan”. This figurative phrase perfectly stroke the chord with 
most Poles. Now the question is: should we still want to become “the second Japan”? 
The answer, anyone?
Conclusions
There are many reasons for linking the overthrow of the Soviet rule and the shift to-
ward democracy in Central and Eastern Europe on the verge of the 1980s and 1990s 
with the economic development of those countries. Contrary to the popular belief, it 
was rather industrialization and economic growth which made the transition possible. 
Modernization, economic development and industrialization bring about universal 
changes to the sets of pre-eminent values in societies across the world. This proc-
ess was involved in the overthrow of the Communist regime as well. The growth of 
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average life expectancy, emergence of liberal aspirations and post-material values are 
all brought about by economic development. It also causes people’s subjective well-
being to rise considerably. However, those “healing effects” of economic develop-
ment cease at a certain point and countries such as Poland have already passed this 
threshold. This puts us in a situation similar to this of advanced Western economies, 
which are nowadays facing the negative effects brought about by several decades of 
economic growth. Therefore, while there is no “finish line” for the capitalist economy, 
we might be facing a question whether working even harder will bring us even more 
benefits of different kind. Basing on the data from other countries, this seems to be 
an improbable scenario. The further development of increasingly difficult life in free–
market economies and its connection with people’s subjective well–being demands 
further research. 
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SISTEMOS TRANSFORMACIJA VIDURIO IR RYTŲ 




Vienas svarbiausių klausimų, susijusių su sistemos transformacija Lenkijoje 
ir kitose buvusiose sovietinio bloko šalyse, yra toks – ar komunistinio režimo 
nuvertimas buvo sukeltas neturtingų valstybių ekonomikos, ar žmonių kovos 
dėl savo teisių? Kad ir kaip būtų, šio klausimo atsakymui „arba... arba“ trukdo 
kita galimybė: tai galėtų būti gera valstybė, kurios ekonomika sudarė palan-
kias sąlygas nuversti minėtą režimą. Be to, nėra abejonių, kad laisvos rinkos ir 
demokratijos įvedimas sukėlė daug pozityvių pokyčių žmonių gyvenime – nuo 
didėjančių galimybių ir gerovės iki augančios pilietinės laisvės. Vis dėlto eko-
nomikos plėtra ir modernumas taip pat sukelia plačiai aprašytų negatyvių pase-
kmių, kurios tam tikrais atvejais naikina pozityviąsias. Lenkija ir kitos Vidurio 
bei Rytų Europos šalys eina šiuo keliu. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: sistemos transformacija, kapitalizmas, ekonomikos augi-
mas, laimė, tradicinės ir sekuliariosios bei racionaliosios vertybės, materialinės 
ir postmaterialinės vertybės, subjektyvioji gerovė. 
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